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In the Bafana Bafana scenario, the South African economy remains firmly stuck in a middle-income trap, accentuated by policy vacillation, investor uncertainty, poor political management and bad implementation. Traditionalists and reformers are at each other's throats within the ANC in an ongoing tussle for control over state resources.
Various options could lead to Mandela Magic. The first is that the reformers emerge victorious from the December 2017 ANC National Conference and adopt policies that allow for a restructuring of the economy to unleash pent-up growth potential. Alternatively a 2018 split in the ANC could result in the formation of a new party of interesting alliances (particularly in Gauteng) that could sharply change national and provincial election outcomes in 2019.
The Nation Divided scenario is one where the traditionalists triumph during the December 2017 ANC National Conference, possibly resulting in a split in the party and the emergence of coalition politics much earlier than in any other scenario. In the long run, this is the worst-case scenario for the ANC and the country (which experiences sustained low growth).
The scenarios that follow are intended to open up thinking about the fluidity of the current situation in the hope for much greater creativity and courage if South Africans are to collectively build a more positive future.
Important milestones on the road to 2024
The time horizon for this paper, and its forecast on possible election outcomes, by the personal experience of apartheid, will change election outcomes at greater volumes each year. These voters are more likely to demand a future in which political parties support and enable economic growth and well-being rather than one that echoes the sentiments of the Freedom Charter and other movements which, despite their historical importance and inspirational character, appear increasingly distant in a consumer-driven era of interconnectivity and globalisation.
These are also voters who are impatient for change and, since a large portion will remain poor and without jobs, the potential for their attraction to populist policies and politicians could see radical politics and violence increase.
'BORN-FREE' VOTERS WILL CHANGE ELECTION OUTCOMES AT GREATER VOLUMES EACH YEAR
Developments in the ANC are key 4 In the period to 2024, the most important determinant of South Africa's development and stability will be developments within the ANC rather than the interaction between the ANC and other parties. The defining moment in this regard will likely be the next National Conference, when the ANC branches in good standing with the organisation will elect the 86-member National Executive Committee (NEC) Although not stated as such in the ANC's constitution, there is general agreement that the ANC president should serve no more than two terms of office, making it unlikely (but not impossible) that President Jacob Zuma will vie for a third term. For the purposes of this paper we adopt the terminology of "traditionalists" and "reformers" as shorthand for the two dominant and competing ideological strands within the ANC.
Although this characterisation is an oversimplification of the complex machinations in the ANC's big tent, it serves as a reference point for discussing the manifold divisions and factions at national level in the ANC.
These two groups are currently involved in an increasingly public battle for control of the levers of power and state-owned companies, key institutions such as the National Treasury and South African Revenue Service (SARS) as well as senior government appointments.
Because South Africa is increasingly a patrimonial state in which loyalty is rewarded, the socially conservative traditionalists would prefer that the current president complete his full presidential term to 2019. They are also probably keen to ensure his successor will be in line with an ANC that maintains Simultaneously, there are other contrasting and overlapping agendas on the road to a choosing new president, such as the intention to protect Zuma from criminal prosecution, described in more detail in the following section.
Traditionalists -rural, black nationalist, socially conservative, loyal to Jacob Zuma, dominated by Zulus, strong commitment to a centralised state, redistributive policies and not constitutionalists.
Reformers -social democrats, typically urban, include larger segment of born-free voters with jobs, multi-ethnic, believe in a mixed economy and the importance of inclusive economic growth, Gauteng ANC and others.
The traditionalists include groups who were originally concerned about the damage that could be done to their interests should Zuma step down before the national or provincial elections in 2019. As Zuma becomes an increased liability for the party, attention is now moving towards identifying and electing a suitable successor.
the current political and economic trajectory -the reformers.
Some of the members of this group find themselves outside the current patronage circle and are motivated by the desire to shift the allocation of state resources closer to home.
Key among these would be the largest part of the ANC in the Gauteng province (who face the most likely threat of losing their majority, positions and influence to the opposition), the Eastern Cape (who lost out when the previous Xhosa influence in the ANC was replaced by Zulu) and minorities in a number of other provinces. This group is generally associated with the current minister of finance, Pravin Gordhan, and the most likely successor to President Zuma, the current deputy president Cyril
Ramaphosa. The reformers are largely committed to inclusive economic growth as the driver of future empowerment.
In the intensifying political competition for leadership within the ANC, alliances and support networks are constantly evolving, as have some of the political concepts used to describe them.
For example, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which were both actively in favour of ousting Thabo Mbeki and of his early replacement by Jacob Zuma, now support Ramaphosa.
Ramaphosa is generally considered to be in ideological support of the "1996 class project" (a phrase assigned to some of Mandela and Mbeki's economic efforts), purportedly in pursuit of a neo-liberal, pro-market agenda. The 1996 class project stands in opposition to efforts towards the "national democratic revolution", a phrase used by various factions within the ANC for different purposes and with different meanings, that is intended to convey an intent to undertake "radical economic transformation" although the same phrase has also been used to refer to the implementation of the purportedly market-friendly National Development Plan, the country's official strategic development plan.
At the heart of all of these concepts and approaches to governance is the quandary of how to improve the livelihoods of the majority of (black) South Africans who make up the lower and unskilled classes. This is essentially a choice that can be captured in the phrases "redistribution through growth" and "growth through redistribution", the former associated with the reformers and the latter with traditionalists.
It's not all Zuma's fault It also includes potential presidential aspirants such as the speaker of the National Assembly, Baleka Mbete.
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Opposing the traditionalists is a growing educated, largely urban (and multi-ethnic) group that is increasingly dissatisfied with no doubt that the current president has become a liability to the ANC due to a litany of unethical behaviour, poor decision-making and proclivity to self-enrichment. Zuma is undoubtedly the most useful recruitment machine for the opposition parties, the DA and EFF in particular. In fact, the longer he remains in power the better these parties are expected to do in the polls, a trend that is reflected in our forecasts.
Much of the economic malaise afflicting the country is actually beyond the control of Zuma, who came into office at a time when the tailwind of global economic growth that had bolstered South Africa's economy turned into an unrelenting headwind. The South
African economy shed 1.1 million jobs in the two years after the local recession hit in the fourth quarter of 2008. It took the economy nearly five years to regain those lost jobs and reach pre-recession employment levels.
Zuma maintains a disinterest in economic policy, and a disdain for investor predictability and the need for policy stabilisation Zuma came to the position of presidency with little to offer in terms of policy or new ideas, except a burning desire to oust Thabo Mbeki and protect himself from an allegedly politically inspired prosecution on a host of corruption charges. The result is a regularly changing (and exceptionally large) cabinet that pays lip service to the vision of the National Development Plan, numerous policy contradictions (such as on visas, management of state-owned enterprises and industrial policy) and a government that is constantly having to defend the office of the president from one ethical and moral lapse after the other. 16 All of these preoccupations sap energy from a party that finds itself consistently embroiled in a public, private and legal rearguard action to clean up after the president.
The preoccupation of the Zuma presidency has been tactical rather than strategic, and is largely concerned with securing personal support within the ANC
The South African president is elected by majority vote in the National Assembly.
Therefore, any party that obtains more than 50% of the 400 seats in the Assembly 
Election trends
The share of the electoral vote won by the ANC in the last two elections points to declining public confidence in the party. South Africa is a laggard in a region that is expected to be among the most rapidly growing globally Bafana Bafana, Nation Divided and Mandela Magic
The South African economy is growing below its potential, and significantly below the 5.4% average rate required by the National Development Plan to reduce unemployment and poverty. Things are going to get worse before they get better, as the damage that has been done by bad management, Table 1 and Figures 9 and 10 summarise the essential elements of the scenarios used in this paper.
We have named the "current path" or business-as-usual future of governance Bafana Bafana, after the South African national soccer team, which has a comparably dismal track record. It is an uninspiring but most likely scenario. The associated national election forecast associated with this scenario is set out in figure 4. This is a future where Zuma is most likely forced to step down as president of South Africa once a new president of the ANC is elected at the ANC's National Conference at the end of 2017 (to avoid a "two centres of power" problem), and is replaced by a compromise slate of traditionalists and reformers -a balancing act that will keep the party united but South Africa muddling along.
The ANC goes into the 2019 national/provincial elections with a new but uninspiring team.
Under a newly elected ANC and South African president, the ANC should obtain in the region of 56% support during the 2019 elections. Our expectation in the Bafana Bafana scenario is that the ANC could fall below an absolute majority of support in 2024.
Given the burden he has become to the ANC, the early departure of Jacob Zuma as president of both the ANC and South Africa would point the country towards the Mandela Magic scenario, which is characterised by a rapid transition to a new leadership dominated by a reformist grouping. As the name suggests, it has the greatest potential economic and developmental benefits for the country -and the most positive election results for the ANC. Mandela Magic sees support for the EFF eventually drop off on the understanding that many EFF supporters' votes were actually a protest vote against the current leadership of the ANC. In addition, ANC voters considering voting for the DA (particularly in Gauteng) may be persuaded to give A worst-case scenario (Nation Divided) for the country is In the period following local elections, tensions will largely be within the ANC at branch level, particularly in rural areas as the slate voting and the vetting process of branches gets underway. Violence is also expected immediately prior to and during the ANC's National Conference.
Clear direction, leadership and opportunity could, over time, see the trajectory of violence decrease, particularly service delivery protests. Similarly, should the ANC and DA form a coalition, effective governance could reduce constraints on muncipalities, and see an increase in government accountability and the implemention of economic policies that provide hope and opportunity.
The periods around 2019, 2021 and 2024 could see increased levels of election-related violence, vote rigging and interference as the ANC seeks to maintain its grip on power despite growing resistance and public anger.
Should the reformers prevail in the elections for the NEC, we could see new leaders begin to mediate in some of the major public issues, lowering tensions and defusing incidents.
Business as usual may see a decline in the anti-Zuma movement, but student protests and service delivery protests could continue. Lack of leadership and continued infighting between traditionalists and reformers will increase frustration and fuel instability.
If the traditionalists win the reformers could split off from the ANC in 2018. These events would likely be violent and heighten tensions. Xenophobia and vigilantism are an increased risk as conditions continue to offer the public little hope.
The 2019 national elections, 2021 local elections and the 2024 national and provincial elections could be particularly violent as the EFF and ANC battle it out, even if within a subsequent alliance. It's unlikely that security institutions would be reformed or improved in this scenario, and more likely that populist policies could incite increased urban violence as city dwellers react to being more and more marginalised compared to their rural peers, the support base of the ANC.
Mandela Magic
More stability Under the business-as-usual scenario, Bafana Bafana, service delivery and labour protests continue and grow, as do antiZuma and student protests. Generally, tensions in the country grow as the political and economic stalemate continues to limit much-needed policy reform.
Decisions in the three policy areas will, in our view, be crucial in shaping the country's future, and therefore require additional comment. These are: electricity supply (nuclear procurement); agreement on a minimum wage; and a possible investment downgrade to so-called junk status. Each is briefly discussed in the annexure.
Party cohesion?
In the case of the ANC, a collapse in support during this forecast period could only occur through a large split in the party. This is In recent years the ANC has split twice, leading to the establishment of the Congress of the People (COPE) and the EFF. Given the current divide between the reformers and the traditionalists, a third, perhaps more serious, parting cannot be discounted. These developments are included as part of the Nation Divided scenario, which presents interesting alternatives for a bad scenario to become either quite positive or even worse.
The more likely outcome is, of course, that the ANC does not do badly enough to shake confidence within the NEC and that a combined reformist-traditional slate is elected that is able to maintain party cohesion (the Bafana Bafana scenario).
The DA's potential challenge relates to the extent to which its newly appointed leader, Mmusi Maimane, is able to lead the continued evolution of the party towards one that attracts a much larger part of the black vote. If this happens at the expense of its traditional support base of white, coloured, Indian and (increasingly) middle-class urban black voters, the party could fall between two stools. The DA faces the ever-present challenge that its support may plateau and, if it is unable to complete its transition to a party that appeals to black voters, it could eventually be replaced as the official opposition. Future prospects of alliance politics (with the ANC and even the EFF) will test the cohesion of the DA with potentially far-reaching results. Expected development to December 2017: South Africa is expected to experience increased levels of social turbulence and violence in the run-up to the August 2016 local government elections, and factional violence within the ANC as the National Conference of December 2017 approaches. The country will likely experience a downgrade to sub-investment status in 2017 that will further dampen economic growth prospects and increase social discord. Poverty, unemployment and crime will increase as the ruling party is absorbed in internal squabbles and fight for the control of key institutions such as the Hawks, National Prosecuting Agency, Treasury and SARS.
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Conclusion
We have argued that developments within the ruling party will be key to the outlook South Africa is increasingly at risk and our margin for error is slim.
A final and separate policy brief, titled Rainbow at risk, sets out the political, social and economic policy implications of our work and associated policy recommendations.
ANNEXURE: Energy, junk status and minimum wage
The three scenarios used in this paper include specifics on electricity, the level at which a minimum wage is set, and South Africa at so-called junk status. These three aspects are discussed in further detail here.
Electricity supply: nuclear or not?
South Africa cannot grow without significant investment (amounting to several trillion rand) in additional electricity supply and in its distribution grid. The question is which mix of technologies to pursue -i.e., the relative weighting of nuclear, renewable, gas or other energy -and what the potential implications of these choices would be.
Decisions about the future of the electricity supply, minimum wage and South Africa's international bond rating could constrain the country's growth trajectory
On the one hand, government has continued its efforts to expand the provision of electricity to poor households, connecting an additional 190 000 households in 2015. 38 On the other hand, electricity consumption is now down to 2008 levels due to higher prices, the changes that higher prices and irregular supply had on large users (furnaces for non-ferrous metals and gold mining accounts for 25% of total consumption and global demand is down), and muted economic activity. 39 Eskom's installed generation capacity was flat from 2009 and decreased steadily from 2012. 40 As a result, Eskom's prime energy availability factor has not significantly improved even though electricity prices go up every year from previously low levels.
Recently, a request for proposal issued by the government for a 9 600 MW of nuclear power by 2030 did not provide any indication of cost. For the purposes of this paper,
we accept the illustrative costs of US$4 000 per installed kilowatt, which amounts to roughly US$38.4 billion, about ZAR600 billion, for the entire project. 41 These are significant levels of expenditure for a country faced with the challenges and growth constraints that have been evident since 2008.
Nuclear energy has many advantages, which include the ability to constantly deliver
ZAR600 billion
THE ESTIMATED COST OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROPOSED NEW NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS almost all of its installed capacity. This is on top of the benefit of reducing carbon emissions, which would allow South Africa to make significant progress towards meeting its international commitments to reducing carbon emissions as part of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. 42 Beyond safety issues the main risk with using nuclear energy is (a) the government's ability to manage such a large procurement without large cost overruns, corruption and wastage, and, most importantly, (b)
the impact of such a large, capital-intensive procurement on the broader economy. 43 There are also differences between the REIPPPP approach and the proposed nuclear procurement process. REIPPPP included a competitive bidding process among a relatively large and diverse group of suppliers, high levels of information and transparency in the bidding process, and careful design and effective management of successive REIPPPP bidding rounds -government learns from each round but does not compete in them itself. None of these apply to the nuclear procurement process, as the decision on the successful bid appears to be based on personal or political considerations. At the moment it is unclear if government will have the opportunity to learn from the first of these plants.
A more flexible approach to electricity planning and possibly even a partly decentralised energy production system would have vastly different implications for South Africa, requiring government to focus its efforts on managing the electricity grid while outsourcing or partnering with private sector suppliers for supply. 47 In this manner, a partly decentralised system with production coming from distributed capacity across the country In a comprehensive study on the costs and benefits of the proposed nuclear build, the Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape Town found that the large investment required will crowd out investment in other sectors and increase the electricity price, potentially placing a significant number of jobs at risk as the economy contracts in response to higher electricity prices. 48 In addition, 'We find that there is a 94% chance that electricity prices will be higher in 2030 with the commitment to nuclear power. In addition, there is 20% chance of the tariff arising from the commitment to nuclear power being 10% greater than that from a flexible planning approach. From this, we can infer, fairly robustly, that the risks of a negative impact on the economy of such a large scale are high.' 49 In the Bafana Bafana scenario, the government proceeds with the full nuclear fleet build but in a staggered manner, despite the high cost of borrowing that follows the likely downgrade to subinvestment status (see the section below).
A reformist ANC is likely to opt for a more flexible approach under Mandela Magic, with a mix of electricity supply that includes one or two nuclear plants. In the Nation Divided scenario, the government proceeds with a large portion of the nuclear build despite a downgrade to sub-investment status
Warning signs have emerged that the full fleet of nuclear generators has been assigned to a Russian company that will accrue to well-connected and powerful actors within the black industrial community in the form of sub-contracts, including the provision of raw materials.
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The minimum wage: at what level?
In yet another attempt to address poverty and inequality (on top of the successful efforts to reduce extreme poverty through the social grants programme), the ANC is set to institute a national minimum wage to replace the current system of sector-specific minimum wages. This comes despite warnings that real wage increases reduce the demand for labour and that a minimum wage prevents the unemployed from gaining work experience.
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Negotiations on the topic between government, labour and business have started. In the current political environment, a minimum wage appears inevitable if the ANC is to placate COSATU. For this reason, we include minimum wage in all three scenarios described above but at different levels.
According to the result of modelling released by the Treasury, a national minimum wage at above R4 000 a month (as proposed by COSATU) would increase unemployment by around 10%, with the potential for negative consequences in labour-intensive tradable sectors. 56 The impact of too high a minimum wage is set out by Brian Kantor, who writes: 'Even after adding 40%
to wage incomes to compensate for "underreporting" in the Labour Force Surveys undertaken by Stats SA, 48% of all wage incomes representing 5 million workers fall below R4 000 per month and 40% earn less than R3 000 per month, about 2.7 million workers out of a total employed of about 13 million.
The proportion of those employed who fall below R4 000 are much higher in the rural areas, higher in agriculture (nearly 90%) and domestic services (95%). At the other end of the spectrum is mining, where 22% of the work force earns less than R4 000
per month. Even in the comparatively well-paid and wellskilled manufacturing sector, about 48% of the work force are estimated to earn less than R4 000 per month.' 57 In summary, a minimum wage of R4 000 a month is not reflective of current market forces, would place a huge burden on employers and is likely to lead to significant job losses.
With this in mind, the Bafana Bafana scenario assumes that a minimum wage is set at around R3 500 per month, sufficiently high to placate COSATU and without the negative impact of large-scale job shedding, while in Nation Divided the minimum wage is set at around R4 500. The higher minimum wage in Nation Divided increases unemployment and pushes up the income of those already in employment, including in the large public sector. Contrary to its stated intent, inequality widens.
In Mandela Magic the minimum wage is set at around R2 700, allowing for sectoral differentiation and motivated exceptions.
As a result, current employment levels are protected but at low wage levels that will, over time, place additional pressure on labour relations.
South Africa at junk status?
A third important component in the scenarios presented in this paper relates to the possible relegation of South African government bonds to sub-investment, or junk, status. Given its low levels of saving, and high unemployment and poverty, South
Africa cannot grow its economy beyond 1.5% on sustainable basis without access to global capital markets.
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Although a host of economic and political measures affect the way credit rating agencies determine the bond status, the greatest challenge for South Africa in the future is its weakening fiscal position (high debt) and slow growth.
In many ways, the market has already factored in the larger risk posed by South Africa's current and future economic and
The ANC is set to institute a national minimum wage to replace the current sector-specific minimum wages
The impact of such a measure on employment is sensitive to the level at which it the minimum wage is set (if it is too high, it will lead to large job losses; if it is too low it will have no impact on poverty or inequality) and is also somewhat sector-specific, often leading to larger job losses in tradable sectors such as agriculture and clothing. 52 Already, the introduction of sectorspecific minimum wages has led to significant job losses in the agricultural and other sectors, despite widespread noncompliance. Minister Nene) from 8.84% on the previous trading day. 60 Even though yields have since recovered much of the December losses, the country continues to pay a price for the larger risk now associated with investing in South Africa.
In general, the better a country's credit rating, the more cheaply it can borrow South Africa is fortunate that only 11% of government debt is in foreign currency, although a hefty slice of that is held by state-owned enterprises that have a legacy of poor management and therefore are an important factor in a downgrade. 61 The impact of a potential downgrade to sub-investment status is serious. Iraj
Abedian sets it out as follows:
When the government credit rating is junk-graded all the private sector corporates, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and subnational entities are likewise junk-graded for their global borrowing requirements. The cost of capital for the country as a whole rises accordingly. This leads to a decline in investments, economic growth, job creation, and tax revenues for the state. And, the longer it takes to end the junk-status, the more the business environment becomes constrained. This makes it harder for the state to deal with socio-economic imbalances and the restoration of macro-economic stability. This in turn exacerbates the historic structural inequalities and social inequities. Since South Africa is already heavily indebted with a significant portion of the budget simply going towards servicing that debt, the result is a low-growth trap as debt repayments crowd out other expenditure. In various recent surveys, a range of economists agree that Standard and Poor's, at least, will drop South Africa's sovereign credit rating to junk status in 2016, 64 with others likely to follow in 2017. 35 Within the ANC, the National Conference is 'the supreme ruling and controlling body of the ANC' and meets at least once every five years to elect the NEC, including the president of the ANC. Currently, the next meeting of the National Conference is slated to occur by no later than December 2017, five years after the last National Conference, although calls for the meeting to be held earlier in the year to elect Zuma's successor are increasingly being heard within and outside the party. 58 I Abedian, Avoiding SA's junk-grade sovereign
THE PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNMENT DEBT IN FOREIGN CURRENCY

